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The clinical microsystem puts medical error and harm
reduction into the broader context of safety and quality
of care by providing a framework to assess and
evaluate the structure, process, and outcomes of care.
Eight characteristics of clinical microsystems emerged
from a qualitative analysis of interviews with
representatives from 43 microsystems across North
America. These characteristics were used to develop a
tool for assessing the function of microsystems. Further
research is needed to assess microsystem performance,
outcomes, and safety, and how to replicate “best
practices” in other settings.
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Health care is provided to patients bycaregivers who work in complex organisa-tional arrangements, but the overwhelm-
ing amount of their own daily work is as part of
“clinical microsystems”. The basic concept of
clinical microsystems—small organised groups of
providers and staff caring for a defined population
of patients—is not new. One can envisage
microsystems existing in every healthcare
setting—primary care clinics, neonatal intensive
care units, renal dialysis units, diabetes care clin-
ics, etc. However, often people lack awareness of
the elements and the dynamics of the small
systems in which they work. Microsystems are
often not recognised as a functioning unit by the
larger organisations that provide the organisa-
tional context for their work. Research has been
important in identifying the extent and general
causal pathways of errors in health care. Addi-
tional research is needed to develop and test bet-
ter ways to prevent errors and improve patient
safety at the microsystem of healthcare delivery—
where patients and providers meet at the front
lines of patient care.
The IOM report “To err is human: building a safer
health system” estimated that 44 000–98 000
people die each year die from medical errors.1
Even the lower estimate is higher than the annual
mortality from motor vehicle accidents (43 458),
breast cancer (42 297), or AIDS (16 516), thus
making medical errors the eighth leading cause of
death in the United States.
Although errors in medication,2 surgery,3 and
diagnosis are the easiest to detect, medical errors
may result more frequently from the organisation
of healthcare delivery. For example, Leape and
colleagues4 discovered that failures at the system
level were the real culprits in over 75% of adverse
drug events. Reason et al5 suggested that some
systems are more vulnerable and therefore more
likely to experience adverse events. Certain
organisational pathologies contribute to what
Reason refers to as “vulnerable system
syndrome”—blaming front line individuals, de-
nying the existence of systemic error provoking
weaknesses, and the blind pursuit of the wrong
type of performance measures (for example,
financial and production indicators).
The recommendations contained in the IOM
report1 emerged from a four-tiered strategy (box
1), the fourth of which is the ultimate target of all
the recommendations and the objective of this
paper, which is to give an overview of the concept
of clinical microsystems and to offer an assess-
ment tool for those wishing to initiate improve-
ments in the safety of care for patients and popu-
lations in microsystems. This tool, which was
developed from the results of a cross-case analysis
of 43 microsystems, can be used to help form an
“awareness” of the microsystem and its function-
ing. The clinical examples provided throughout
the paper are based on our experience in the
United States.6 Working at the level of the
microsystem, it is possible to develop generalis-
able methods for application across macro-
organisation settings for error reduction.
INTRODUCTION TO CLINICAL
MICROSYSTEMS
The “organisation” has been the conventional
level of analysis for management of diverse types
of healthcare personnel. Some attention has
focused on the design of work units within the
organisation, such as medical staff, 7 surgical
staff,8 nursing staff, support groups, interdiscipli-
nary teams,9 and the applicability of these work
units to specific areas of care such as aging, long
term care, renal therapy, and oncology. In general,
however, research at the level of the microsystem
Box 1 IOM recommendations
• Establish a national focus on patient safety by
creating a centre for patient safety within the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.
• Identify and learn from errors by establishing
nationwide mandatory and voluntary report-
ing systems.
• Raise standards and expectations for improve-
ment in safety through the actions of oversight
organisations, group purchasers, and profes-
sional groups.
• Create safety systems inside healthcare or-
ganisations through the implementation of
safe practices at the delivery level.
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within the organisation has received limited attention. Social
policy has also focused at the organisational level and
individual provider level, thus missing the potential contribu-
tion of how the structures and strategies of the microsystem
affect patient outcomes as well as affect the performance of
the microsystem.
Research in managing safety has focused on the culture and
structure of the organisation.10 11 Perrow10 advanced the theory
that accidents are inevitable in complex, tightly coupled
systems such as chemical plants and nuclear power plants.
These accidents occur irrespective of the skill of the designers
and operators, hence they are “normal” and are difficult to
prevent. He further argues that, as systems get more complex,
the system becomes opaque to its users and therefore people
forget to be afraid of potential adverse occurrences. Organisa-
tional models view human error more as a consequence than
a cause, and stress the need for proactive measures of “safety
and health” with constant reform of the systems processes.
Both Perrow and Vaughn emphasise the structural and
organisational dimensions or organisational processes, mak-
ing the case for assessing the operations of an organisation
which we extrapolate to the microsystem. Finally, organisa-
tional flexibility means possessing a culture capable of adapt-
ing to changing demands. High reliability organisations
(HROs)12 are an example of highly complex technology sensi-
tive organisations that must operate to a failure free standard.
Examples include naval aircraft carriers and air traffic control.
These organisations carry out demanding activities with a
very low error rate and an almost complete absence of
catastrophic failure over many years.
The microsystem concept is based on an understanding of
systems theory13–15 coupled with James Brian Quinn’s theory of
a smallest replicable unit.16 17 Nelson and colleagues18 have
described the essential elements of a microsystem as (a) a core
team of healthcare professionals; (b) the defined population
they care for; (c) an information environment to support the
work of caregivers and patients; and (d) support staff, equip-
ment, and a work environment. A focus on microsystems is a
way to provide (1) greater standardisation of common activi-
ties and customisation of care to individual patients, (2)
greater use and analysis of information to support daily work,
(3) consistent measured improvement in performance, (4)
extensive cooperation and teamwork across disciplines and
specialties within the microsystem, and (5) an opportunity for
spread of best practices across microsystems within their
larger organisations.18
MAKING THE LINK BETWEEN SAFETY AND THE
MICROSYSTEM
Initiating the improvement of the safety of care for patients
and populations in clinical microsystems involves increasing
the work unit’s “awareness” of its functioning as a microsys-
tem and a “mindfulness” of its reliability. We usually think of
awareness and mindfulness as things to which individuals
aspire. These reflective states are an invitation to consider the
clinical microsystem to be composed of individuals who func-
tion together as systems, capable of reflecting on their work.
Awareness of one’s own work unit as a system is a matter of
identity and is connected to purpose. Learning to increase the
safety and reliability of organisations can be addressed in
many ways.1 19–22 Weick and Sutcliffe offer the idea that HROs
have become so by their “mindfulness.”23 By mindfulness they
mean that these organisations are:
• Preoccupied with failure: they “treat any lapse as a symptom
that something is wrong with the system, something that
could have severe consequences if separate small errors
happen to coincide at one awful moment.”
• Reluctant to simplify interpretations: they “take deliberate steps
to create more complete and nuanced pictures. They
simplify less and see more. Knowing that the world they
face is complex, unstable, unknowable, and unpredictable,
they position themselves to see as much as possible.”
• Sensitive to operations: they recognise that “unexpected events
usually originate in what James Reason called “latent fail-
ures”. These “loopholes in the system’s defences, barriers
and safeguards . . . consist of imperfections in . . .
supervision, reporting of defects, engineered safety proce-
dures, safety training, briefings, certification, and hazard
identification. Normal operations may reveal these lessons,
but [they] are visible only if they are attentive to the front
line, where the real work gets done.”
• Committed to resilience: they “develop capabilities to detect,
contain, and bounce back from those inevitable errors that
are part of an indeterminate world . . .. [they are not error-
free, but errors don’t disable them] . . . it is a combination of
keeping errors small and of improvising workarounds that
keep the system functioning.”
• Deferent to expertise: they encourage decisions to be made at
the front line and migrate authority to the people with the
most expertise, regardless of rank.
According to Weick and Sutcliffe, becoming more mindful
means practising more of these behaviours. Mindfulness
implies “a radical presentness” and a connection to the actual
requirements of the current situation along with a chronic
sense of unease that something catastrophic might occur at
any moment. This sense is inculcated to all members of the
unit, from the leaders to the most junior people on the team.
The relationship between mindfulness and the microsystem
requires further clarification. The focus on microsystems
invokes consideration of team performance and the relation-
ship of individuals within teams. The idea of high reliability
organisations suggests that team and individual performance
depends on the development of certain organisational norms.
Such cultural attributes are commonly seen as properties of
larger systems than teams. Is it possible for mindful microsys-
tems to exist in dysfunctional organisations? In considering
this possible relationship between a “mindful” microsystem
and a dysfunctional organisation, it is important to recognise
the importance of the larger system to the success or failure of
the microsystem, as reported by an interviewee at a geriatric
unit when asked about how the larger system has supported
the efforts of the microsystem:
“The administration has continued to support the geriatric unit by
providing both staffing and general resources. Getting a ‘yes’ for a
request from the administration depends on how they feel about you
and your department. On the converse, rarely do units exist in a
vacuum. So, where there is a larger structure, there are always poten-
tial negatives.”
Furthermore, a focus at the microsystem level changes the
role of senior leadership—indeed, this is not a minor detail.
The Health Care Advisory Board reported that a common
ingredient in successful organisations is a “tight, loose, tight”
deployment strategy.24 25 What might this mean for creating a
microsystem striving to provide safer care? It would mean that
senior leaders would mandate that each microsystem should
have a “tight” alignment of its mission, vision, and strategies
with the organisation’s mission, vision, and strategies. But it
would also mean that senior leadership gives each microsys-
tem the flexibility needed to achieve its mission. Finally, it
would mean that senior leaders hold the microsystems
accountable to achieve its strategic mission to provide safer
care.
LEARNING FROM CLINICAL MICROSYSTEMS
We have worked with several microsystems seeking to
improve their care for patients. Some of them seemed to have
a clear sense of their identity as a system and, when they
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explored change for the improvement of their functioning,
they were able to incorporate the change and make it a regu-
lar part of their identity as a system. Others—lacking a simi-
lar sense—pursued change just as diligently, but seemed to
have difficulty incorporating that change into their “system”.
As we have begun to tease out the characteristics of the
apparently better functioning small systems, certain elements
or characteristics have emerged.
As part of a study funded by the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation,6 interviews were conducted with representatives
from 43 microsystems and eight characteristics present across
multiple microsystems were identified (box 2). The methods
used for this study are discussed in detail elsewhere.6 26
Each of the dimensions can be thought of on a continuum
that represents the presence of the characteristic in the
microsystem. Table 1 summarises the characteristics and pro-
vides an operational definition for each of them. Increased
awareness of the small front line work unit as a microsystem
means recognising the characteristics that contribute to their
identity (the elements described in table 1) and being mindful
of the reliability of these characteristics. A more detailed
description of each of the characteristics is given below with
verbatim comments from the interviews.
Integration of information
Universal among high performing microsystems is integration
of information. Microsystems vary on how well information is
integrated into its daily work and the role that technology
plays in facilitating the integration. An illustrative comment
from a microsystem operating in an “information free
environment” follows:
“If you aren’t going to have the same nurse working with the patient
then you have to have better communication. Patients get the best care
when you have health care workers who communicate very well and
collaborate very well. One of the biggest problems I see is physicians not
talking to each other. Also, so many nurses work part-time, varying
shifts. We struggle with getting them to communicate. It’s hard to get
them to put equal emphasis on communicating, documenting, teach-
ing and the physical tasks that need to be done before the end of the
shift. You don’t get the same negative feedback from your coworkers if
you aren’t teaching the patient as you do if you leave some of the physi-
cal tasks undone at the end of the shift. A nurse will prioritize and get
every thing done before the end of the shift, but they don’t look at the
patient’s care plan and do the teaching that needs to be done before dis-
charge.”
Deming taught that knowledge is built on theory, not
information.27 According to Deming, information is static
whereas knowledge has a temporal spread. Put simply, with
knowledge a theory can be developed that explains what hap-
pened in the past and predicts what will happen in the future.
It is the integration of the information that allows us to create
knowledge. Technology can be instrumental in facilitating the
integration of information within the microsystem.
“Sharing information with patients is the biggest safeguard against
medical error. The electronic medical record (EMR) does drug-drug
interaction alerts. When the patient leaves the office, he/she gets a
printout of their medication list. Once in a while a patient will call later
and say, ‘I was looking over the list, and I am not taking x anymore, but
Dr So and So has put me on y.’ It takes all of us. Another safeguard is
that the system we use forces me to consider all the possibilities. For
example, if a patient comes in with headaches and vomiting, it has a
structured sequence that makes you consider the causes, including cer-
ebral hemorrhage.”
Measurement
Effective microsystems measure what they do and recognise
that the measures at the macrosystem level are not always
helpful at the microsystem level. Part of the work of the
microsystem becomes the development of a set of measures
that are appropriate for the goals of the microsystem. As one
interviewee concluded:
“At the local level I don’t get the measures that I need and the meas-
ures at the regional level aren’t at the level I need.”
It may be that this recognition is important in developing a
microsystem that routinely measures processes and outcomes,
feeds data back to providers, and makes changes based on
data.
“We can track process length through our real time ‘flight simula-
tor’ system. By touching the screen, we instantly know such things as
arrival to bed, bed to nurse, arrival to doctor aggregated cycle times.”
Interdependence of care team
Key players—the providers and staff who work together on a
daily basis—are a fundamental element of the microsystem.
However, the interdependence of these key players tends to
vary across microsystems. Microsystems with a high degree of
interdependence are mindful of the importance of the multi-
disciplinary team approach to care, whereas those with a
lower degree of interdependence are characterised by provid-
ers and staff working as individuals with no clear way of shar-
ing information or communicating.
“We developed multidisciplinary rounds—everyone involved in car-
ing for the patient. The major value is having everyone communicate
directly with one another. Each person knows they may be asked about
the patients and has to be prepared.”
“Often physicians have difficulty working with non-physician
providers, giving them the control. Some physicians don’t do well shar-
ing responsibility for patient care like this.”
Supportiveness of the larger system
The larger organisation may be either helpful or “toxic” to the
efforts of the microsystem.
“The hospital system has shown great effort in helping us out with
patient restraint protocols. Restraint management has been an area
where they have excelled and this has made the ER a safe place to work.
They are also helping us out in quality end-of-life issues and how cul-
tural differences of people necessitate individualized care.”
Box 2 Characteristics of effective microsystems
• Integration of information
• Measurement
• Interdependence of the care team
• Supportiveness of the larger system
• Constancy of purpose
• Connection to the community
• Investment in improvement
• Alignment of role and training




• Information is key, technology may be
very helpful
Measurement • Microsystem routinely measures processes
and outcomes feeds data back to
providers, makes changes based on data
Interdependence of
care team
• Care provided by a multidisciplinary
team, information is key to the relationship
Supportiveness of the
larger system
• Microsystem views larger organisation as
helpful




• Microsystem is a resource to the




• Resources made available for
improvement (training, money, time)
Alignment of role and
training
• Health professionals expected to work at
the upper limits of education, training
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“It is a mixed message. The organisation talks about team care but
then subverts their vision—they put in a centralized phone system with
a nurse in charge of scheduling appointments. Well, she has no way of
knowing whether Drs X and Y are on the same team. If a patient of Dr
X cannot go to Dr X because he is on vacation, the nurse may send the
patient to Dr Z though Dr Y is on Dr X’s team. So instead of the patient
going to Dr Y, they go to Dr Z.”
Constancy of purpose
An important characteristic of a microsystem is that the aim,
or what Deming would refer to as “the constancy of
purpose”,27 is consistent with the aim of the larger system and
guides the work of the microsystem. Where constancy of pur-
pose is high, the aim is apparent to the microsystem, and it is
also communicated across the boundaries of the microsystem.
“The thing that distinguished those places that are achieving excel-
lence is the organizational culture. Our culture was ‘of course babies
[in the NICU] get infections, they are not well to begin with’. But those
other sites saw an infection as a failure, not entitlement. All the way to
the bedside the unit knew that infection was a failure. The philosophy
has to permeate the organization.”
In contrast, lack of a clear consistent aim may be destructive
to the microsystem and, ultimately, to patient care.
“There are various ways that health care workers let patients know
that we are busy—don’t tell us that you are having a problem because
we don’t have time to deal with that. For a lot of nurses the reason for
being a nurse was to relieve pain and suffering. But then we send the
message that we don’t have time to help you.”
Connection to community
Connection to community represents a symbiotic relationship
between the microsystem and the community that extends
well beyond the clinical care of a defined set of patients.
“The neonatology group has a commitment of being a resource to
the region. We have a commitment to the health of a population. This
is crucial to our success. As a resource, we provide education and review
the quality of care for the whole region.”
Investment in improvement
An investment in improvement comes in the form of resources
such as time, money, and training, but above all it involves
creating a philosophy of improvement within the microsys-
tem. This characteristic overlaps with “supportiveness of the
larger organisation” and suggests an obvious way in which the
larger organisation can support the work of the microsystem.
“In a given week we are spending about 100 person-hours on teams.
People are being paid to spend their time doing this, not just during
their lunch hour. Someone said, ‘You have to assume you’ll be around
here 5 years from now. Do you want to be doing things the same way?’
Most of us don’t. This requires a new attitude that results in
understanding that industries must invest in change in these
microsystems. You have to tolerate pulling people off-line to work. This
is a radically new way of thinking in medicine, which traditionally
views any sort of meeting as a waste of time. Traditionally, the view is
that the only useful time is spent seeing patients. I think that unless you
spend time considering how to deliver care better, much of that time
seeing patients is wasted.”
Alignment of role and training
Alignment of role and training suggests that there is a delib-
erate effort within the multidisciplinary team to match the
team member’s education, training, and licensure with their
role. While several interviewees indicated that this leads to
increased staff satisfaction and lower turnover, some are
uncomfortable working in what they consider to be an
“expanded” role. As one interviewee said: “casualties move on
to other parts of the hospital”.
“The system can be an advocate. It can be a reminder that a mam-
mogram needs to be done, that there is a system in place to make sure
it happens, that things go well. A system can empower the medical
assistant to insist that a patient be seen, even if it means clashing with
a provider.”
IMPROVING THE QUALITY AND SAFETY OF CARE IN
THE MICROSYSTEM
The eight characteristics discussed above were used to create a
self-assessment tool (shown in Appendix on page 50) for
individuals to assess the functioning of their microsystem and
to identify potential areas to focus improvements. We have
observed that use of the tool is successful in facilitating
discussions around ideas for individual microsystems trying
to foster further development of their system and/or a given
characteristic.
Several limitations apply to the use of this assessment tool
in its present form. Each represents an opportunity for further
empirical testing and research. Firstly, we recognise that
increasing the strength of an attribute or characteristic does
not necessarily increase the overall functioning of the unit as
a system. We make the assumption that, as efforts are made to
increase the expression of a characteristic in a microsystem,
efforts are concurrently being undertaken to integrate the
newly expressed element into the functioning of the enhanced
unit as a better functioning system. Secondly, we recognise the
need for further testing, development, and validation of the
assessment tool. However, we caution people about waiting for
the “perfect” method or tool if there are tools available that are
useful as you try to improve awareness of the functioning of
your microsystem. Finally, we make the assumption that a
better functioning microsystem provides safer care and
achieves better outcomes for its patients.
CONCLUSIONS
The concept of microsystems and the assessment tools to
assess and evaluate characteristics of a microsystem can make
a great contribution to the future study and management of
patient safety. We believe that most health care today is
sought, created, delivered, and purchased at the level of the
clinical microsystem. It is there that real gains in the quality,
value, and safety of care can occur. Furthermore, we believe
that efforts to increase awareness and mindfulness at the level
of the clinical microsystem can contribute to the safety of
patient care. Combining organisational characteristics with an
analysis of the characteristics of an individual microsystem
Key messages
• A clinical microsystem is a small organised group of
clinicians and staff working together with a shared clinical
purpose to provide care for a defined set of patients.
• The clinical purpose defines the essential parts of the
microsystem. Use of information is key to its ability to func-
tion; information technology facilitates collecting, assess-
ing, and sharing of information.
• Microsystems are usually part of a larger organisation and
are embedded in a legal, financial, social, and regulatory
environment.
• Answers to the following questions are needed to define the
microsystem:
• what is the aim or purpose?
• who is the small population of people who benefit
from this aim?
• who do you work with daily (administratively, techni-
cally, and/or professionally)?
• what information and information technology is part
of the daily work?
• Senior leaders of the microsystem should:
• look for ways in which the macro-organisation
connects to and facilitates the work of the
microsystem;
• support the needs of the microsystem;
• facilitate the coordination among microsystems.
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offers a powerful way to visualise the link between structure,
process, and outcomes and to make practical what is theoreti-
cally attractive.28
The implications of the microsystem framework for the
delivery of care are much broader than just for a given
microsystem and the people working within it. There is a need
for ongoing research into microsystems, how to assess their
functioning, performance, outcomes, and safety, and how to
replicate “best practices” in other settings. Clinical leaders can
find new energies for common efforts to study and improve
their work for patients as they gather around the focus of the
actual unit of daily practice—crossing disciplinary and
specialty boundaries—using the language of processes and
systems, rather than the more conventional role or discipline-
bound conversations that often seem to limit change and
improvement. If the microsystem is a new frontier in organi-
sational and health services management research, further
research is needed to understand the contributions of practice
based research in improving the delivery of safer care.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Integration of information 
with providers and staff
Instructions: Each of the following themes (e.g. integration of information) is followed by a series of descriptions. For each theme, please check the description that best describes your current microsystem 
and delivery of care.
   We are always tracking down the 
information we need to do our work
Theme Descriptions
   Most times we have the information we need, 
but other times essential information is missing 
and we have to track it down
   We get the right information at the right
time to perform our work
   Can’t 
   rate
Integration of information 
with patients
   Generic reading materials are available 
in patient areas
   Standardised information is offered
to all patients based on the diagnosis
   We offer comprehensive information to address 
patients’ different learning styles. The information 
is customised to meet the patient’s needs
   Can’t 
   rate
Integration of information 
with technology
   Patient records are paper based in our 
microsystem
   Our patient records and financial systems are 
computer based, but separate
   Our patient records and financial systems
are to some extent or entirely integrated
   Can’t 
   rate
Measurement    We don’t track results of the care we 
provide on a regular basis
   We systematically collect data on
the results of the care we provide
   We routinely collect data on the results of the care 
we provide, feed data back to providers, and make 
changes based on data
   Can’t 
   rate
Interdependence of
the care team
   Each person works solo and is responsible 
for their piece of work. There is no clear way 
of sharing information or communicating
   The care approach is multidisciplinary and we 
meet weekly to discuss topics, but we don’t work
together as a team on a daily basis
   Care provided by a multidisciplinary team.
Overall, we function very well together as a team. 
Information is key to the relationship and there are 
clear ways to share information and communicate
   Can’t 
   rate
Supportiveness of the
larger organisation
   We get very little support from the larger 
organisation. In fact, we have been asking for
“X” and they have not responded for quite 
some time
   Getting help from the larger organisation has 
been a mixed bag, sometimes we get what we ask 
for but sometimes we don’t
   The larger organisation is helpful, and in fact they 
make it easier for us to meet the needs of our patients 
and to work together as a team
   Can’t 
   rate
Constancy of purpose    There is a lack of a clear consistent aim 
that is communicated throughout our
microsystem
   The overall aim of our microsystem is clear to me, 
but I don’t think that it is clear to every one else 
I work with
   There is a clear consistent aim that is integrated 
throughout the microsystem. You can see it in our 
everyday work
   Can’t 
   rate
Connection to
community
   Our focus has been on our patients that 
come into our unit. We have not done any 
outreach programmes
   We have tried a few outreach programmes and 
have had some success, but I would not say it is the
norm for us to go out into the community
   We are doing everything we can to understand 
our community and we actively employ resources to 
help us work with the community and define their needs
   Can’t 
   rate
Investment in
improvement
   The training and resources are
not available for working on
improvement
   The resources (training, money, time) are available 
for working on improvement, and we occasionally
use them
   The resources (training, money, time) are available 
for working on improvement and we use them all 
the time. Furthermore, improvement is a priority
   Can’t 
   rate
Alignment of role and
training
   Everyone is not expected to work within the 
limits of their education, certification (some
people are overqualified)
   For the most part the work everyone is expected to 
do is appropriate for their skills and training
   Everyone is expected to work at the upper limits of 
their education, training and licensure
   Can’t 
   rate
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